## 1NC Round 7

### 1

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have to instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a topical plan.

#### B. Violation – the aff doesn’t defend a plan.

#### C. Best for fairness.

#### 1. Plan focus is the only predictable way of affirming the resolution. Philosophical and theoretical concerns certainly play into the ways that policies are made, but the resolution only calls for us to defend and/or question political-institutional implementations of these kinds of concerns.

#### 2. Plan focus is the only way to ensure a fair division of ground. The affirmative has the advantage of trying to solve the most heinous problems of the status quo—without plan focus, debates devolve into whether or not things like racism, sexism, classism, or homophobia are good or bad. While problems are often less contestable, solutions to these problems are—we can debate about whether or not a particular proposal will fix or worsen these problems and proffer our own solutions.

#### D. Best for education:

#### No solvency for their critique without institutional focus. We must try to change policy in order to change the world—the concentration of power in the hands of political elites is inevitable, so we must work within that system to check oppression and violence.

Themba-Nixon 2k [Makani, Executive Director of the Praxis Project, *Colorlines* 3.2, pg. 12]

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

### 2

#### Heidegger’s focus on ontology operates at the level of superstructure - it mystifies analysis of the material substructure that is necessary for a true revolutionary position

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

In the most basic terms, of course, both Heidegger and Marx agree that, as Marx puts it, "at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such antagonistically confronts it" (Economic Manuscripts 105)—that is, that consciousness is alienated from reality. But Heidegger's hostility to the "general consciousness" is deeply tied to his romantic treatment of technology and technological thinking. "In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper," Heidegger argues, "every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others' in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 'they' is unfolded' (Being and Time 154). Elaborating his machine-thinking, Heidegger here perhaps makes most manifest his rejection of the working class "mass," within whom (it is assumed) all individuality is lost and one sinks into "averageness" and "mediocrity." Deeply aware of the growing international power of the organized working class, not only in the Soviet Union, but throughout Europe and even in the US after the first world war, what Heidegger "sees" in the strengthening urban proletariat is an indistinguishable mob threatening unique authenticity (individuality), which is a code for private property. As a result, it is not the property relations which strip workers of the means of production, forcing them to work for someone else that Heidegger sees as the root problem of the working class. It is instead the machines that cause the working class to lose their individual freedom and individuality, not workers' class relation to machinery but the machinery itself (along with its instrumental thinking). Thus the homogenization (abstraction) of labor by capital gets translated as "leveling down" and "averageness" which themselves are then equated with "publicness." The "city" (the space in which technology is most concentrated) then is rejected because it "controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted" (165). Nature in turn becomes the romantic space in which "every difference of level and of genuineness" and the "heart" of matters are experienced outside of social interpretation—as the "ineffable." This of course leads Heidegger, in his later writings, to become more and more concerned with the consequences of technology's "enframing" logic for nature. As he puts it in "The Question Concerning Technology," in a technological age "even the cultivation of the field has comes under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry, air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example" (320).¶ For Heidegger, the conflict between "consciousness and real life" (Marx) is ultimately a mode of thinking that has not been attentive to Being, and can be remedied with a new mode of thinking. For Marx, by contrast, this results from the social relations in which the products of human's labor are alienated from them. Only a society in which a few own the means of production can others be in a position that they not only must sell their labor to survive but under conditions in which they have no control over or property in their product of labor. "How would the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger," Marx asks, "were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the summary of the activity, of production... In the estrangement of the object of labor is merely summarized the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labor itself" (73-4). For this reason, there can be no moving beyond the situation in which people are alienated from their productive activity ("hammering") unless the social relations of production are transformed. But Heidegger bypasses change of material relations by suggesting that hiding behind (or "alongside") the materiality of the everyday world of tools is a deeper, more elusive being—one which renders the relation of subject and object far more "ambiguous" (subjective) and which can be accessed only through intuition. For Heidegger, the more authentic approach to Being can only take place through the "qualitative experience" constitutive of being-in-the-world as against the "abstract" (concept) or theory.¶ It is, however, only abstraction that allows one to grasp the abstract material relations underlying experience. To repeat, the hammer is material not because of the qualities of its "thingness" (the argument of mechanical materialism and matterism) but because of the abstract social relations which both produce it and which determine its applications and its "meanings." In the guise of putting forward a new notion of the (immaterial) "material," Heidegger's argument is a means of dismantling the concepts needed for materialist explanation of the world. Without concepts which make connections between apparently fundamentally different entities and phenomena, there is no way to understand the labor relations which position people in structurally similar ways much less the economic laws which compel capital to exploit labor. Heidegger forgets, in other words, that "pre-reflective" or "primordial" experience is the space of ideology. Focusing only on the excessive "experience" of labor thus directs attention away from the material world which shapes experiences and onto the subjective ways of thinking about experience as an isolated "in itself": precisely the ideological ways of thinking capital fosters so as to inhibit working people from identifying common (class) interests and collectively fighting for them.¶ Ultimately, then, as Lukács put it, Heidegger represents "the philosophical 'third way': the claim to be above the antithesis of idealism and materialism (which he terms realism)" (Destruction of Reason493). That is to say, "He claimed to be arguing an objective doctrine of Being, an ontology, but he then defined the ontological essence of the category most central to his world on a purely subjectivistic basis, with pseudo-objectivistic expressions" (496). The real value of Heidegger's writings has thus been their ideological function for capital. Confronting catastrophic contradictions, Heidegger sought to understand the nature of human being not in the social relations of production, but in "primordial" ways. He launched a major offensive against instrumental thinking—what was for him a metaphysical will to presence that impeded humans' ability to grasp their true relation to Being—and developed new ways of comprehending the embeddedness of the subject in its environment, so as to blur the boundary between subject and object that had been a cornerstone of Cartesian and Newtonian thinking. But in so doing, he separated instrumentality from the relations in which instruments come to dominate human life and human thinking. His ontology, which in the light of its broader historical context functioned to establish a philosophical basis for the recovery of a defeated nation, has operated since then, in diverse ways, to absorb the contradictions of the imperialist era of capitalism into the realm of a more ephemeral and fluid conceptualization of existence. Thus, while posthumanism ostensibly critiques Heidegger's "essentializing" of the human, as I will address later on, his idealist treatment of being and machine-thinking informs the entire structure of posthumanist thinking and is a testament to its ultimately conservative role in the 21st century.

#### Heidegger reduces concioussness to self experience and meaningless jargon in a move that is co-opted by capital to deny the existence of capital as objective

Schroyer 67 (Trent, professor of Sociology-Philosophy in the School of Social Science and Human Services at Ramapo College in N.J., June 1967, foreword to “The Jargon of Authenticity” by Theodor W. Adorno, xii-xvi)

In The Jargon of Authenticity Adorno applies the method of immanent criticism to contemporary German existentialists (e.g., Buber, Jaspers, Heidegger, etc.). His basic thesis is that after World War II this philosophical perspective became an ideological mystification of human domination – while pretending to be a critique of alienation. Use of existentialistic terms became, Adorno argues, a jargon: a mode of magical expression which Walter Benjamin called an “aura.” In the aura of existentialism the historical need for meaning and liberation was expressed, but in a way that mystified the actual relation between language and its objective content. Adorno’s critique focuses on the jargon’s incapacity to express the relation between language and truth, in that it breaks the dialectic of language by making the intended object appear present by the idealization inherent in the word itself. The jargon, therefore, falls into an objectivism that conceals the difference between philosophical reflection and the in-itselfness of the object of reflection to maintain a self-consciousness of the mediation of fact through the thinking subject. Consequently, in the jargon objective consciousness is compressed into self-experience, and an idealism results. ¶ But the societal result of this idealistic tendency is that the jargon shares with modern advertising the ideological circularity of pretending to make present, in pure expressivity, an idealized form that is devoid of content; or, alternatively, just as the mass media can create a presence whose aura makes the spectator seem to experience a nonexistent actuality, so the jargon presents a gesture of autonomy without consent. Adorno’s analysis here continues Marx’s analysis of the fetishism of commodities, in that the symbolisms of the jargon do not represent actual social relations but rather symbolize only the relations between abstract concepts. Lost in the fetishism of the jargon is the actuality of the historical development of human consciousness. That the subject itself is formed, and deformed, by the objective configuration of institutions is forgotten, and thus reified, in the jargon’s pathos of archaic primalness. Consequently, there is a loss of the objective context of human society and an idealistic compression of all historical consciousness into the sphere of self-experience. For example, Adorno cites MartinBuber’s I and Thou and Paul Tillich’s stress that religiousity is an end in itself, as instances of the shift to subjectivity as an in-it-selfness. In both cases, the words are referred to the immediacy of life, to attitudinal and qualitative aspects of self-experience. One needs only to be a believer; the objective content of belief has been eclipsed in the subjectiviation of objective content. To be a Christian seems to be a personal question – independent from the historical divinity of Christ. Without necessarily intending to do so, this extreme subjectivity transforms existentialistic language into a mystification of the objective constraints that block the autonomy and spontaneity of the historical subject.¶ Hegel proclaimed philosophy a “homecoming” that critically reconciled objective discord and subjective consciousness. His intent was to maintain a meaningful totality by the reflective mediations of critical reason. Reflection has as its aim the critiuqe of abstractions, or in Marxian terms, of reifications. In this way, Marx’s work attempted to demonstrate the nonequivalence of exchange in the capitalist economy – thereby restoring to human consciousness a critical mediation of economic exploitation. ¶ Adorno implies that contemporary German existentialism began from a higher level of capitalist development, in which the sociocultural antagonisms are much deeper than economic exploitation and extend into the subject’s ego itself. Therefore, the haste with which the existentialists and their jargon attempt to achieve a reconciliation, irregardless of the depth of the need. The resulting movement to a radical indwardness and its expressions of authenticity, freedom, etc., is an attempt to actualize these ideals outside of the objective social context: to fulfill heroic cultural models independent of the society. Behind these empty claims for freedom the socioeconomic processes of advanced capitalist integration continue, intensifying the dependence of all persons upon large organizational units for employment and welfare. The jargon’s “belssings” conceal this objective context of unfreedom, and in the name of critical reflection the jargon joins hands with modern advertising in celebrating the meaningfulness of immediate experience.¶ Hence for Adorno, German existentialism and related genres, such as neoromantic lyric poetry (e.g., Rilke), come to a head in a mythic jargon that reduces the dialectial relationship of reflective critique to the objective content and context of subjectivity. The result is an ideology of the simple in which the primal sense of pure words is elevated in a futile attempt to overcome the “alienation” that remains linked to the political-economic framework of society.

#### Their rejection of positivism subverts the anti-capitalist struggle – it is only from the objective material facts of class that the exploitation of labor can be explained and undermined

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.23-25, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

Objectivity is not writing (epistemology); it is the very structure of reality, which is another way of saying it is ontological. Bourgeois pedagogy, in an ideological maneuver concealed as a philosophical questioning of positivism, reduces the ontological to the epistemological and then deconstructs the epistemological as an effect of textual displacement and, in doing so, denies the existence of an objective reality. Idealist pedagogy, which is a theoretical arm of the ruling class, has always opposed the objective and objectivity in order to elevate the theological and the speculative and thus foster illusion in the mind of students - future workers. Positivism, which has ruthlessly opposed the theological and the metaphysical since the height of capitalist pedagogical theory in the nineteenth century, has been the target of unrelenting attacks by bourgeois radical pedagogy. The most recent assaults against positivism are mounted by post-al writings (poststructuralism, postmarxism, postcolonialism, postmodemism), which disperse the objective in the play of errant tropes (Derrida), in hegemonic consensus (Laclau and Mouffe), and in cultural affect (Hall). As my arguments for privileging the conceptual, the non-observable structures of the "working day" (exploitation), the critique-aI, and anti-instrumental teaching (that is, against teaching as "skills" training) demonstrate, the pedagogy of totality is antipositivist. Even though positivism has fought theological and metaphysical speculations, which are always spaces in which class interests lurk, it is, as a philosophical movement, subjectivist and antimaterialist (see Lenin, Materialism). The antimaterialism of positivism is now recirculated, with an antipositivist rhetoric, in the neopositivist theories of post-aI pedagogies from poststructualism (Derrida's corpo- real textualism) and neo-Gramscian postmarxism (Lac1au and Mouffe's empiricist hegemonism) to articulatory cultural theory (Hall's actualist analyses). The pedagogy of totality demonstrates the anti-critique-al instrumentalism of these neopositivist pedagogies by foregroundingtheir teaching strategies which erase the why of critique-al teaching and substitute for it the how oftechne. Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, and Hall are exemplary of the new pedagogues who, following positivist tendencies, deny concept, abstractions, and laws of motion and instead found their practices on the sense-able (that is, the sensuous and the observable), on rhetorical instantism and, above all, on semiotic physics to assert the singular and, as in all positivism, cancel the universal. Objectivity is produced by human practice, the basis of which is labor-material production. To be more clear, objectivity is the outcome of "social metabolism, "the dialectical relation of labor and nature (Marx, Capital 1, 198). By "dialectical," I do not mean "two-way," "hybrid" and! or "multifaceted"-as Euroamerican marxists do. Rather, I use the concept as "the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects" (Lenin, "Conspectus" 251-52). Contradictions, class struggles, the law of value, and social and economic crisis, which form the foundation of all contemporary social practices, are not epistemological. Rather, they are the fundamental structure of reality under wage labor. In other words, as humans produce their material1ife through their labor, they produce the objective (world). In producing their material1ife, to be precise, humans "enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will" (Marx, Capital 21). The subject of transformative pedagogy is the structure of these objective relations (that underlie knowledges), which are produced by humans but are independent from their consciousness, since "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness"(22).The pedagogy of totality is both objective and emancipatory it is emancipatory because it is objective: "[K]nowledge which cannot be regarded as objective is powerless or useless.... The practices relying on such pseudo-knowledge are adventurist and even harmful. Failing to meet the requirement of objectivity, they are bound to become arbitrary" (Naletov 139). The eradication of the objective is always and ultimately an economic act: it is part ofthe class struggles ofour time over the surplus labor ofthe global proletariat. By obscuring the objective, for instance, triumphalist neoliberalism has effectively marginalized (objective) labor, which is the source o f social wealth (and thus o f science) and instead has valorized the (subjective) consciousness as producer ofwealth (knowledge), as in the concept of "knowledge capitalism." The fact that the "subjective" is itself an accumulation of many objectivities - it is produced in the production of material life-is concealed by the theological theories of the autonomy of consciousness popularized by such writers as Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Levinas, and the recirculation of Bergsonian theosophy in the religious writings of Deleuze, Guattari, and new feminist theosophers such as Elizabeth Grosz. The pedagogy of totality, through class critique, unpacks the theo-semiotics of consciousness-as-excess that now dominates radical bourgeois pedagogy. To focus on individual consciousness and language instead of the objective world is to mis-educate people by teaching them the textual strategies of deep fantasizing about themselves and their place in the world-as-is instead of the knowledge that enables them to act on the world. In the end, this lesson only naturalizes wage labor and the fantasizers' subservient position in it. As the objective economic reality of wage-labor produces wealth for the transnational bourgeoisie and brings misery and daily alienation to the rest ofpeople, students who are taught by the pedagogy of the affective that objectivity is a language fiction, learn to compensate for their abjection through retreating into deep cultural dreaming and consuming popular culture, which like the pedagogy of affect manufactures mass fantasies. To teach for human emancipation, pedagogy has to abandon the fetish of consciousness and language so that it can re-ground itself in the objective reality of human labor.

#### The logic of capitalist exploitation results in extinction through creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### Vote negative - historical materialist analysis is the only way to break free from contradictions

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Dialetical materialism is essential – it is the only truly revolutionary strategy

Lukacs 1919 (George, Hungarian philosopher, He was the founder of Western Marxism, “What is Orthodox Marxism” http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm)

If the question were really to be formulated in terms of such a crude antithesis it would deserve at best a pitying smile. But in fact it is not (and never has been) quite so straightforward. Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx’s individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious ‘orthodox’ Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in toto – without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief’ in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or ‘improve’ it have led and must lead to over-simplification, triviality and eclecticism. 1 Materialist dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic. This definition is so important and altogether so crucial for an understanding of its nature that if the problem is to be approached in the right way this must be fully grasped before we venture upon a discussion of the dialectical method itself. The issue turns on the question of theory and practice. And this not merely in the sense given it by Marx when he says in his first critique of Hegel that “theory becomes a material force when it grips the masses.” [[1]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#1) Even more to the point is the need to discover those features and definitions both of the theory and the ways of gripping the masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle of revolution. We must extract the practical essence of the theory from the method and its relation to its object. If this is not done that ‘gripping the masses’ could well turn out to be a will o’ the wisp. It might turn out that the masses were in the grip of quite different forces, that they were in pursuit of quite different ends. In that event, there would be no necessary connection between the theory and their activity, it would be a form that enables the masses to become conscious of their socially necessary or fortuitous actions, without ensuring a genuine and necessary bond between consciousness and action. In the same essay [[2]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#2) Marx clearly defined the conditions in which a relation between theory and practice becomes possible. “It is not enough that thought should seek to realise itself; reality must also strive towards thought.” Or, as he expresses it in an earlier work: [[3]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#3) “It will then be realised that the world has long since possessed something in the form of a dream which it need only take possession of consciously, in order to possess it in reality.” Only when consciousness stands in such a relation to reality can theory and practice be united. But for this to happen the emergence of consciousness must become the decisive step which the historical process must take towards its proper end (an end constituted by the wills of men, but neither dependent on human whim, nor the product of human invention). The historical function of theory is to make this step a practical possibility. Only when a historical situation has arisen in which a class must understand society if it is to assert itself; only when the fact that a class understands itself means that it understands society as a whole and when, in consequence, the class becomes both the subject and the object of knowledge; in short, only when these conditions are all satisfied will the unity of theory and practice, the precondition of the revolutionary function of the theory, become possible. Such a situation has in fact arisen with the entry of the proletariat into history. “When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing social order,” Marx declares, “it does no more than disclose the secret of its own existence, for it is the effective dissolution of that order.” [[4]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#4) The links between the theory that affirms this and the revolution are not just arbitrary, nor are they particularly tortuous or open to misunderstanding. On the contrary, the theory is essentially the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process itself. In it every stage of the process becomes fixed so that it may be generalised, communicated, utilised and developed. Because the theory does nothing but arrest and make conscious each necessary step, it becomes at the same time the necessary premise of the following one.

#### Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

### Case

#### Their aff dooms us to extinction – only pragmatic political action can solve and allow the space for metaphysical investigation. This also answers their argument that ontology outweighs nuclear war arg.

Santoni 85 (Ronald E. Phil. Prof @ Denison, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7 )

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the ams race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” ¶ Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of ¶ being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is *not* to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” ¶ continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved wll ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

#### Their infatuation with ontology is politically debilitating – focusing on ontology divests politics of its emancipatory potential and devolves into a self-justifying cycle of never-ending critique.

Yar 2k (Ph.D in the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University, Majid, “Arendt's Heideggerianism: Contours of a `Postmetaphysical' Political Theory?,” Cultural Values, Volume 4, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Complete)

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.[21]

#### Focus on ontology is bad - preventing widespread death takes precedence.

Davidson 89 (Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, Arnold, coeditor of Critical Inquiry, Critical Inquiry, Winter 1989. p.426)

I understand Levinas’ work to suggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings: “The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face… Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted- in our relations with men… The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men… that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.” Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face: and, in a clear reference to Heidegger’s idolatry of the village life of peasants, he associated himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgement of others: “As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn’t the other suffer the fate of God?… I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God [CR, p.470].” The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger’s thought accounts, I believe, for the absence, in his writing after the war, of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will. So Levinas can see in Heidegger’s silence about the gas chambers and death camps “a kind of consent to the horror.” And Cavell can characterize Nazis as “those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do.” Where was Heidegger’s horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah Arendt associates Heidegger with Paul Valery’s aphorism, “Les evenements ne sont que l’ecume des choses’ (‘Events are but the foam of things’).” I think one understands the source of her intuition. The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop.

#### Their link arguments totalize calculative thought – Calculation is a product of social institutions, like capitalism, not individual actions

Eldred 9 (Michael, Univ of Sydney, *Left Curve*, no 24, http://www.arte-fact.org/capiteen.html.)

Here, as everywhere else, Heidegger totalizes calculatingness without taking the economy into account, i.e. he consistently neglects what 'regulates' the 'regulating circuits' of capitalist economic activity, namely, the essentially contingent value-form. Because he did not learn anything essential from Marx, Heidegger characterizes present-day society not as capitalist society, but as "industrial society" (ibid.): "It is subjectivity relying entirely on itself. All objects are aligned towards this subject." (ibid.) In view of the Marxian analysis of the essence of commodity fetishism (which has to be thoroughly understood and should not be used erroneously, as in conventional left-wing cultural critique, as a code-word for the deranged tendency of modern humans to consume) which fathoms and presents the essential phenomenon of objects slipping out of the controlling hands of human subjects, no matter whether individual or collective, it must be concluded that Heidegger did not understand the Marxian alienation of essence of the subject in capitalism and thus missed the opportunity of thinking through modern technology in its essential sameness with capitalist economy.

#### Phenomenology fails – ontology factually doesn’t come first

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

The observer independent is ontologically primary, the observer dependent is derivative. Now here is the interest of all this for the present discussion: Heidegger has the ontology exactly backwards. He says the ready-to-hand is prior, the present-at-hand is derivative. The hammers and the dollar bills are prior to the sheets of paper and the collection of metal molecules. Why does he say this? I think the answer is clear; phenomenologically the hammer and the dollar bill typically are prior. When using the hammer or the dollar bill, we don’t think much about their basic atomic structure or other observer independent features. In short, Heidegger is subject to the phenomenological illusion in a clear way: he thinks that because the ready-to-hand is phenomenologically prior it is ontologically prior. What is even worse is that he denies that the ready-to-hand is observer relative. He thinks that something is a hammer in itself, and he denies that we create a meaningful social and linguistic reality out of meaningless entities. Rather he says we are “always already” in a meaningful world. Here is what he says: The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, [my italics] as if we were talking such “aspects” into the “entities” which we proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were “given subjective colouring” in this way. (Heidegger 1962, 101) This seems wrong. If you take away the rhetorical fl ourishes in his prose, the view that he says is false, is the correct view. The characteristic of being money or a hammer is precisely a “way of taking them”. Such features as being money or being a hammer are observer relative and in that sense the object is “given subjective coloring” when we treat it as a hammer. Heidegger’s views are expressions of his rejection of the basic nature of the basic facts.

#### Being is a useless philosophical narrative and its pursuit condemns actual people to death

Caputo 93 (John D. – prof Phil. Villanova) Against Ethics p. 30

That would mean you cannot have an obligation to Being or Spirit or the People, nor can Being or Spirit oblige anything. Being, Spirit, History, Man: the playthings of Greco-German mythophilosophizing, which is my somewhat free translation of *die Sache* *des Denkens* (which I claim, as a translation, is *wahr* if not *richtig*). Nothing happens in or to Being and Spirit. What happens happens to beings that bear up or bend under what is happening. Being cannot suffer a disaster, or suffer oblivion, because it does not suffer at all. Being and Spirit are mythico-super-Subjects, the upshot of totalizing attempts to describe what is happening, leaving those of us with proper names to face the worst. History and Being, History and Spirit, the History of Being, the History of Spirit: so many tall tales and meta-narratives, gigantic, stories that forsake the minima moralia of damaged live, the minute scraps and remands Being leaves behind. A disaster is a damaged life, damaged beyond repair. ¶ Being shows no interest in damaged lives; they are none of Being’s business (Sache). Indeed, many bleeding bodies may well be a sign that Being or Spirit is on the mend, or on the march, healing itself and making itself Whole or Holy, getting ready for the Other Beginning, while the dead are left to bury the dead. Forget Being. There is nothing to remember. Replace it with a mnemo-technique for remembering proper names.

## 2NC

### Overview

#### K turns the aff – Technological thought is a product of social institutions, like capitalism, not individual actions

Eldred 9 (Michael, Univ of Sydney, *Left Curve*, no 24, http://www.arte-fact.org/capiteen.html.)

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#### K turns the aff - capitalism reduces everyone to standing reserve by viewing all people and things in terms of their market value, ready to be used as resources to create a profit - this justifies the extermination of devalued people

Kovel 2 Professor of Social Studies at Bard, 02 (Joel, “The Enemy of Nature,” p140-141)

The precondition of an ecologically rational attitude toward nature is the recognition that nature far surpasses us and has its own intrinsic value, irreducible to our practice. Thus we achieve differentiation from nature. It is in this light that we would approach the question of transforming practice ecologically — or, as we now recognize to be the same thing, dialectically. The monster that now bestrides the world was born of the conjugation of value and dominated labour. From the former arose the quantification of reality, and, with this, the loss of the differentiated recognition essential for ecosystemic integrity; from the latter emerged a kind of selfhood that could swim in these icy waters. From this standpoint one might call capitalism a ‘regime of the ego’, meaning that under its auspices a kind of estranged self emerges as the mode of capital’s reproduction. This self is not merely prideful the ordinary connotation of ‘egotistical’ — more fully, it is the ensemble of those relations that embody the domination of nature from one side, and, from the other, ensure the reproduction of capital. This ego is the latest version of the purified male principle, emerging aeons after the initial gendered domination became absorbed and rationalized as profit­ability and self-maximization (allowing suitable ‘power-women’ to join the dance). It is a pure culture of splitting and non-recognition: of itself, of the otherness of nature and of the nature of others. In terms of the preceding discussion, it is the elevation of the merely individual and isolated mind-as-ego into a reigning principle. ‘~ Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way. The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally. When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom­panied

### A2: Perm – Do Both (K Aff)

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### The permutation is severance – it severs out of the methodology of capitalism rooted in the 1AC. This a voting issue because it creates a moving target that steals neg ground a makes it impossible to debate.

#### Ethics DA – We have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

### Link

#### Heidegger forgets the objectivity of the historical process as the idea of Dasein becomes mythologized. The notion of Dasein as both ontic and ontological stops the activity of dialectical existence rooted in subjective and objective reciprocity.

Schroyer 67 (Trent, professor of Sociology-Philosophy in the School of Social Science and Human Services at Ramapo College in N.J., June 1967, foreword to “The Jargon of Authenticity” by Theodor W. Adorno, xvi-xvii)

Adorno’s reconstruction of Heidegger’s philosophy attempts to show that it becomes an ontology that retreats behind, rather than overcomes, the tradition of transcendental philosophy. In the universalization of transcendental subjectivity into Dasein, the empirical is totally lost and, as Adorno claims, an essence-mythology of Being emerges. This exemplified in the claim that the primacy of Dasein is a realm beyond fact and essence and yet one which maintains itself as an identity. Whereas critical reason was able to show that maintenance of identity of consciousness presumposed a dialectic of subjective and objective reciprocity which was unified only in the constituitive activity of concrete subjectivity itself, Hediegger’s notion of Dasein as both ontic and ontological stops the dialecticity of conscious existence in an idealistic elevation of the absolute subject. To quote Adorno: whatever praises itself for reaching behind the concepts of reflection – subject and object – in order to grasp something substantial, does nothing but reify the irresolvability of the concepts of reflection. It reifies the impossibility of reducing one into the other; into the in-itself (italics added).¶ Adorno’s thesis is that Heidegger’s notion of selfness remains a reified tributary of Husserl’s concept of subject. This concept of subject, in attempting to overcome the pure possibility of the ontic, claims to be itself concrete. Hence, Heidegger dogmatically proclaims his concept of existence as something in opposition to identity – while at the same time he “continues the tradition of the doctrine of identity with his implicit definition of the self throughits own preservation.” Hence, Adorno examines the notions of “Dasein,” “authenticity,” “death,” “care,” etc., and shows that their use evades the issue of historical determinateness by means of a primary and absolute creative subject – which is, by definition, supposedly untouched by reification.¶ Hence, the aura of authenticity in Heidegger is that it names “nothing”; the “I” remains formal and yet pretendss that the word contains content in-itself. For Adorno, Heidegger’s existentialism is a new Platonism which implies that authenticity comes in the complete disposal of the person over himself – as if there were no determination emerging from the objectivity of history.

### Alt

#### Our alt is the only way to solve their root cause arguments – Heidegger’s sole focus of scientist thinking fails

Eldred 9 (Michael, Univ of Sydney, *Left Curve*, no 24, http://www.arte-fact.org/capiteen.html.)

Therefore it cannot be a matter of bedevilling productionist ways of thinking, which are our heritage, and Heidegger himself underscores often that he is not hostile to technology and what it offers. Rather, he is aghast at the totalizing of productionist ways of thinking which, especially as modern, scientific ways of thinking, arrogate to themselves the status of occupying the sole locus of truth, compared to which all else is merely poetic fantasy and other forms of cultural embellishment and entertainment. By following Heidegger's genealogy of Western thinking, starting with Aristotle's ontology of productive power, we can come to appreciate that in the bosom of this thinking nestles a will to power over change and movement of all kinds with the ultimate aim that, from the present, knowledge can govern the calling to presence from the future of what is foreseen and precalculated to come. But with his single-minded focus on the productionist, setting-up nature of Western thinking, Heidegger himself was blind to another phenomenon that drew the attention of Greek thinking and which plays a ubiquitous role throughout history: exchange. Exchange here can be taken in both the narrower sense of economic trade and intercourse, and the broadest sense of interchanges of all kinds that are the fabric of human social living, including conversation, greeting, complimenting, insulting, love-making, arguing, coming to blows, and so on.

### Terrorism

#### The War on Terror has the same economic motives as every other war under capital; the redirection of surplus capital is the sole objective in the war on terror

Red Critique 2 (“Democracy as Class Apartheid”, May/June, <http://redcritique.org/MayJune02/democracyasclassapartheid.htm>)

The junta has executed a coup d’etat inside the country and unleashed war outside its geographical borders—a war, which seems to have been planned well before the 9/11 attacks to help transnational capital in obtaining the rights to appropriate the oil and labor of central Asia. As with all wars, this one too is an apparatus of transferring wealth from the working people of the world to transnational capital. The political dividend of the war has been that it not only has repressed the right to dissent but also hidden the fact that the US economy is in a tailspin, social security exists only on paper and Medicare without prescription drugs is a cruel hoax. A cultural slogan—patriotism—is once again used to cover up an economic reality—to deprive working people from basic economic assistance—education, food, health care—in order to fill the pockets of the ruling class by tax cuts and redirecting government expenditure. Billions of dollars are now channeled to the weapons industry and its allies to make more sophisticated weapons when hundreds of students in inner city schools have to share a few outdated computers!

#### The war on terror is an expression of the commodification of people deemed disposable because of the color of their skin

Smith 4 (Instructor at the Cultural Studies Doctoral Program at George Mason, Paul, “Precarious Politics”, SYMPLOKE 12: 1-2, 2004, pp. 254-260, Project Muse)

The nub of all this comes early in the book, when Butler proposes to consider "the conditions under which certain human lives are more vulnerable than others, and thus certain human lives more grievable than others" (30).Thus, she asks why it is that Americans cannot grieve the Muslim dead in the post 9/11 conflicts. The absence of the Muslim dead from the news and the obituaries is immediately aligned with the struggles of "sexual minorities . . . transgendered people . . . intersexed people . . . [the] physically challenged" and racial minorities, all of whom struggle with the social imposition of parameters of the human, with normative values and "culturally viable notions of the human" (35). This sweeping homology is driven home by reference to "the queer lives that vanished on September 11," who went unrecognized in the obituaries and whose relatives were "belatedly and selectively . . . made eligible for benefits" (35). This rather breathtaking alignment has perhaps the opposite effect to that intended. Here and elsewhere Butler is at pains to say that she's not calling for simply some warm and fuzzy inclusion of excluded subjective into the faulty normative schemes that she sees all around her. Instead, she is calling for what she calls "an insurrection at the level of ontology" (33). (If that's to be the new slogan of radicalism, Bush, Ashcroft, Rumsfeld and their ilk probably aren't going to be losing a lot of sleep!) But rather than offering ways to reconceive relational subjectivity, or even simply highlighting the specific struggles of different subjects, Butler in effect produces nothing more than some rough equivalency amongst all those who somehow don't fit neatly into the "culturally [End Page 256]viable notions of the human." To conceive of such an equivalency you have to do a lot of stripping away of materiality and you have to be virtually impervious to levels of specificity. At best, what Butler is pointing to here is a purely discursive or ideological homology, and it turns out to be a very incomplete homology even in its own terms. That is, there's something analytically wrong when Butler's highlighting of the "vanished lives" from the WTC can't include the laborers, janitors, food workers, homeless people and undocumented immigrants who died there, and whose struggles for recognition were not just about their access to "culturally viable notions of humanity" but equally about their economic value. In mostly unpublicized struggles to gain compensation and benefits, the relatives of many of these people, as well as attack survivors themselves, confronted the simple fact that their lives were simply not valued. The struggles of many of these people continue, three years after the attacks. These kinds of people don't appear in Butler's pantheon of victims—and nor do her victims themselves appear as labor, or as subjects whose identity is in any way at all constituted by their relation to capitalism (even though this might well be why they were attacked, as representatives of a predatory capitalist imperium). This elision, executed during Butler's cheerleading for the principles of inculsivity and relationality, is more than simply symptomatic of Butler's approach; it is a reminder of the weakness of any consideration of identity that cannot or will not entertain the historical and material conditions under which such identities are formed. In the end, what divides and differentiates subjects is not some factitious, contingent and unsatisfactory use of the category "human;" rather more it is the continual and relentless depredations of capital. So it's not really "conditions" that Butler investigates in this book; she isn't asking about American imperialism, or media power, or any of the material factors that inflect contemporary ideologies. Rather, she is simply pointing to some of the discursive structures and attitudinal habits that express those conditions.

## 1NR

#### Heidegger’s eagerness toward the eternity of death prolongs the continuing use of death as a threat and justification for war – only through the material change of the alternative can we have a proper relationship towards death

Adorno 73 (Theodor W., German sociologist, “The Jargon of Authenticity” p.153-158)

By saying “the ‘they’ does not permit us the courage in the face of death,” Heidegger actually lays bare certain elements of ideology, such as the attempt to integrate death into just that societal immanence which has no power over death. A similar development can be seen in Evelyn Waugh’s parody The Loved One. Some of Heidegger’s formulas come very close to the mechanism of sublimating death. “But temptation, tranquilization, and alienation are distinguishing marks of the kind of Being called ‘faillling.’ As falling everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death.” Alienation, however, designates a social relationship, even if it is the relationship to death. Man and the institutions of piety reproduce commercially the unconscious will to forget what one has to fear. Fundamental ontology and its nomenclature are not necessary for insights like the following: In this manner the “they” provides a constant tranquilization not only for him who is “dying” but just as much for those who “console” him. And even in the case of a demise, the public is still not to have its own tranquility upset by such an event, or be distrubed in the carefreeness with which it concerns itself. Indeed the dying of Other is seen often enough as a social inconvenience, if not even a downright tactlessness, against which the public is to be guarded. In the same manner Ibsen’s assessor Brack already concluded, about Hedda Gabler’s suicide, “One doesn’t do that sort of thing.” Heidegger, who does not want to have anything to do with psychology, has seen through the reactionary nature of the integration of death. He has himself done this in a psychological fashion. The message is coded in Sein und Zeit. But in thus falling and fleeing in the face of death, Dasein’s everydayness attests that the very “they” itself already has the definite character of Being-towards-death, even when it is not explicity engaged in “thinking about death.” Even in average everydayness, this ownmost potentiality-for-Being which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, is constaintly an issues for Dasein. This is the case when its concern is merely in the mode of an untroubled indifference towards the uttermost possibility of existence. ¶ In spite of that, he does not go far enough. Heidegger cannot make us feel and respect the despair embodied in that cramped “Enjoy life” and in that supid commonplace, “one will die sometime, but not quite yet” – a commonplace which he rightly despies. The commonplace represses our despair. The protestation against the sublimating of death would have its place in a criticism of liberal ideology. That criticism would proceed to remind us of the naturalness which is denied by culture. For in domination culture itself propagates this naturalness. It does it by means of that which mistakes itself for the antithesis to nature. Instead of this, Heidegger does the same things as fascism; he defends the more brutal form of Being, negative as it may be. It is possible to think of a social state in which men would no longer have to sublimate death and might be able to experience it in another form than fear. To experience death in fear is a mark of the crude natural state that Heidegger’s doctrine has eternalized in supranaturalistic terms. Death is sublimated because of a blinded drive for self-preservation; its terror is part of the sublimation. In a life that is no longer disfigured, that no longer prohibits, in a life that would no longer cheat men out fo their dues – in such a life men would probably no longer have to hope, in vain, that this life would after all give them what it had so far refused. For the same reason they would not have to fear so greatly that they would lose this life, no matter how deeply this fear had been ingrained in them. From the fact that men sublimate death, one cannot conclude that death is itself the authentic. Heidegger is least of all in a position to do this, as he is careful not to attribute authencitity to people who do not sublimate death. By means of a kind of philosophical Freudian slip, Heidegger himself defines the ontolgizing of death insofar as death, in its certainty, is qualitatively superior to other phenomena. “We have already characterized the everyday state-of-imind which consists in an air of superiority with regard to the certain ‘fact’ of death – a superiority which is ‘anxiously’ concerned while seemingly free from anxiety. In this state-of-mind, everydayness acknowledges a ‘higher’ certainty than one which is only empirical.” The “higher,” in spite of the quotation marks, has the proving force of a confession: theory sanctions death. The partisan of authenticity commits the same sin of which he accuses the minores gentes, the lesser people of the They. By means of the authencitity of death as he flees from it. Whatever announces itself as “higher” than mere empirical certinatity, in this attitude, falsely cleanses death from its misery and stench – from being an animalistic kicking of the bucket. This cleansing occurs in the same manner as a Wagnerian love- or salvation-death. All this is similar to the integration of death into hygiene, of which Hediegger accuses the inauthentic. By means of that which is kept silent in the high stylization of death, Heidegger becomes an accomplice of what is horrible in death. Even in the cyncial materialism of the dissection room, this horribleness is recognized more honestly and denounced more strongly than in the tirades of ontology. The latter’s kernel is nothing but the supraempirical certainty that death is something that has been existentially preordanined to Dassein. Purity untouched by experience plays over into that which it once was unmetaphorically: purity untouched by dirt. But by no understanding can death be said to be pure. Neither is it anything apodictic otherwise, all the salvation promises of religion would simply be forgetful of Being. However, they are by no means needed. Some lower organisms do not die in the same sense as the higher, individuated ones. Thus, in light of our potential, and growing, control over organic processes, we cannot do away a fortiori with the thought that death might be eliminated. Such an elimination of death may be highly improbable; yet it can be thought of, and according to existential ontonology that should be impossible. The affirmation of the ontological dignity of death, however, is already reduced to nothing by the possibility that something can change it ontically – according to Heidegger’s language. Insofar as Heidegger cuts off these hopes at what inquisitors probably call the root, the authentic one speaks for all – for all those who join, as soon as they hear of this possibility, in the refrain that nothing would be worse than the disappearance of death. It seems legitimate to assume that those are the adepts of the jargon. The eagerness toward the eternity of death prolongs the continuing use of death as a threat. On a political level death advertises the necessity of wars. Kant, who subsumed immortality under the Ideas, did not let himself fall to those depths in which nothing else flourishes but the affirmation of what is all too familiar. If Heidegger had made the transition from the inorganic to the organic, the existential horizon of death would have been thoroughly changed. His philosophy, and everything that floats with it, down to the last sewers of German faith unto being, could nowhere be more vulnerable than in this transition. That understanding with the existent which motivates the elevation of the existent to being thrives on the complicity with death. In the metaphyics of death there comes to a head all that evil to which bourgeois society has physically condemned itself, by means of its own process of development.

#### Their isolation of ontological reflection as delinked from and prior to material conditions reintrenches capitalist alienation through the division and individualization of labor

Marx 1845 (The German Ideology, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm)

Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity – enjoyment and labour, production and consumption – devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that “spectres,” “bonds,” “the higher being,” “concept,” “scruple,” are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.¶ Private Property and Communism¶ With the division of labour, in which all these contradictions are implicit, and which in its turn is based on the natural division of labour in the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, is given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property: the nucleus, the first form, of which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this early stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of disposing of the labour-power of others. Division of labour and private property are, moreover, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.¶ Further, the division of labour implies the contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual family and the communal interest of all individuals who have intercourse with one another. And indeed, this communal interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as the “general interest,” but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided. And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. [2]